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INTRODUCTION

The Brazilian Congress recently passed the controversial
Presumed Organ Donor Law (PODL) which mandates that
"[u]nless manifestation of will to the contrary, in the scope of this
Law, it is presumed that authorization is given for the donation
of tissues, organs and human body parts, for the purpose of
transplantation or treatment of diseases."' The purpose of the
law is to increase the number of donor organs and to simplify the
organ-donation process.3 In addition, the law aims to reduce
organ trafficking.4 However, the law, which became effective on
January 1, 1998, has fueled widespread public debate in Brazil
on the legal, ethical, cultural, religious, and public policy
ramifications of compulsory organ donation. 5
Because of strong legal, political, medical, and religious
challenges, the law has not been implemented.6 Critics of the law
prefer specified voluntary donation instead of mandatory
donation.7 More importantly, opponents of PODL fear that the

1. D.O.U. No. 9.434, de 4 de fevereiro de 1997, D.O. 1997.
2. CHAPTER II, Art. 4. To be exempted from the program, a citizen must have
"[t]he expression 'non-donor of organs and tissues' ... engraved in an indelible and
inviolable manner in the Civil Identity Card or in the Driver's License of a person who
opts for this condition." Id. at § 1. The law precludes the use of organs from people who
are deemed legally incompetent, as well as minors and any unidentified decedent. See id.
at Arts. 5 & 6.
3. Bill Seeks to Make all Brazilians Organ Donors, Reuters, Jan.16, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter "Bill Seeks"]. Sen. Lucio Alcantara,
who drafted the bill, claims that the law is needed because "Brazil suffers from a lack of
donors and paperwork that makes organ-donation complicated." Id.
4. See id.
5. See Andrea McDaniels, Brazil Mandates Organ 'Donation' for Transplants,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 1998, at 1.
6. See id. Many doctors refuse to obey the law because they believe it "violates the
individual's right to choose and unfairly impacts the poor." Id.
7. See Brazil Passes Automatic Organ Donations, UPI, Jan. 16, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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poor, the illiterate, and those who are unaware of their legal
rights will be disproportionately burdened by the law because
they may be unaware or unable to opt-out of the program.'
In its haste to increase the pool of organ donors through
presumed organ donation, the Brazilian government has failed to
include essential provisions to address the potential legal,
ethical, and social issues which PODL poses. The most glaring
weakness of the law is that it does not allow family members to
raise legal objections to the harvesting of the deceased's organs
where the deceased did not have the opportunity to oppose organ
donation before death.
This Comment will analyze the possible legal, ethical and
social impact of presumed organ donation in Brazil. Part I
reflects on the legislative history of the Presumed Organ
Part II examines possible alternatives to
Donation Law.
presumed organ donation and analyzes their viability within the
context of Brazil's legislative objectives. Part III highlights the
advantages and disadvantages associated with presumed organ
Finally, Part IV suggests modifications to the
donation.
Presumed Organ Donation Law to address the concerns that the
law raises.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRESUMED CONSENT ORGAN
DONATION LAW

The main objective of the law is to boost the number of organ
donors,9 and thereby increase the number of transplants in
Brazil."0 Moreover, the law aims to reduce organ trafficking and
streamline the organ donation process." Proponents of the bill
argue that a government survey indicated that seventy percent of'
citizens pooled support the move to adopt presumed consent to
organ donation. 2 Additionally, supporters of the bill claimed that
8. See Mario Osava, Brazil: Public Opposes Compulsory Organ Donation, Inter

Press Service, Jan. 12, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
9. See Bill Seeks, supranote 3 and accompanying text.
10. See Fabiana Frayssinet, Brazil-Health: Concern Over Organ Donation Law,
Inter Press Service, Feb. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Currently, Brazil averages only eight transplants per one million inhabitants compared to
25 transplants per million in the United States and Europe. See id.
11. See Bill Seeks, supranote 3. Organ trafficking is an ongoing problem in Brazil.
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
12. See Osava, supra note 8. A poll conducted by the Brazilian daily, Folha de Sao
Paulo, indicated that there was a reduction in the number of citizens willing to donate
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many Brazilians awaiting organ replacement will benefit from
the increased number of organs available for transplant
operations. 13 Those in favor of the bill also argued that since
similar laws exist in several European countries,
14 Brazil was not
donation.
organ
compulsory
adopting
in
unique
Opponents of the bill countered that Brazil's problem was
not a shortage of donors but a lack of adequate infrastructure to
support an effective organ donation system." Furthermore,
critics argued that the Brazilian version of mandatory organ
donation is distinguishable from the European models because
the European system allows family members to "opt-out" a
deceased family member who did not have the opportunity to
exercise her opposition to donating her organs."' Religious
legislators who prefer a traditional system where donors must
make an affirmative voluntary commitment to become an organ
donor also opposed the bill. 7 The Federal Council on Medicine
also challenged the constitutionality of the bill on the grounds
that the bill violates both the individual rights of citizens and
medical ethics because it forces doctors to engage in practices
that violate their consciences. 8
The bill was vigorously debated in several public forums and
in the media. 9 It survived two votes in the Senate and another in
the Chamber of Deputies and was finally approved in October
1997. 20

organs from 75% to 63% between 1995 and 1998. See id.
13. See Bill Seeks, supra note 3.
14. See Brazil Law Makes all Citizens Organ Donors, REUTERS N. AM. WrRE, Feb. 4,

1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Spain and Belgium were the two
examples cited. See id.
15. See Wayne Kondro, Brazil's Law on Organ Donation Passed, 349 THE LANCET
482 (1997).
16. See Osava, supra note 8. Brazilian doctors also argue that presumed organ
donation only works when a country has an efficient health system and a large educated
middle class that is aware of its legal rights - both requirements which Brazil lack. See
McDaniels, supra note 5, at 1.
17. See Brazil Passes Automatic Organ Donations, UPI, Jan. 16, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
18. See McDaniels, supra note 5, at 1. "The freedom of conscience and of belief is
inviolable.... " C.F. Art. 5, § VI.
19. See Osava, supra note 8.
20. See id.
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO PRESUMED ORGAN DONATION
A wide variety of organ procurement systems have been used
by different countries to secure an adequate supply of donor
organs." The challenge many governments face is to strike a
balance between procuring the maximum number of organs while
simultaneously respecting the religious, ethical, constitutional
and property rights of its citizenry.22 Numerous factors prevent
states from obtaining the maximum number of organs possible."
This section describes the four major types of organ procurement
systems used by different nations and analyzes their
applicability to the Brazilian situation.

A. No Domestic Organ Procurement
Under a "no domestic organ procurement" system, the
removal of organs is prohibited because of the belief that the
deceased must be buried with all her organs. 24 Few nations have
employed this strategy, with Japan and Iran being notable
exceptions." Normally, strong religious or cultural objections
from citizens in these countries bar the state from implementing
a no domestic organ procurement policy. Consequently, organ
demands must be met by traveling overseas to purchase organs
or through importation.27 Thus, a no domestic organ procurement
approach is extremely deferential to the cultural and religious
values of a nation.

21. See Christian Williams, Combating the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and
Inadequate OrganSupply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L.
L. 315 (1994).
22. See id. at 329-30.
23. These include: the education of the public about the benefits of organ donation;
public attitude regarding organ donation; governmental and health professionals'
attitudes toward organ donation; moral or ethical objections to organ donation caused by
religious or cultural traditions or enacted laws; potential property rights the donor or his
family might have in the organs; the civil or privacy rights the donor may have in the
organs; the cost of the transplant operation; hospital resources for transplants; organ
resources for transplant; political or social motives to be achieved through organ donation;
and the determination of death in relation to the usefulness of the cadaveric organs. See
id. at 317.
24. See id. at 332.
25. See id. at 331.
26. See id. at 332.
26. See id. at 331-32.
27. See id.at 332.
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However, while a no domestic organ procurement policy
reflects a state's respect for the cultural or religious values of a
society, this model clearly will not achieve Brazil's goal of
increasing the supply of transplant organs. Furthermore, apart
from the international backlash this policy causes because of
perceived unfairness and the concern over a country's image as a
"consumer of body parts,"" importation of organs encourages
organ trafficking because of the profit motive and would
therefore be inconsistent with the Brazilian legislature's intent of
reducing organ trafficking." Additionally, given the lack of a safe
and reliable supply of organs, importation of organs may well be
the least reliable means of organ procurement."0 A "no domestic
organ procurement" policy is therefore not a viable alternative to
presumed organ donation within the context of Brazil's current
legislative objectives.

B.

Voluntary Non-PecuniaryDonation of Human
Organs

Under a system of voluntary non-pecuniary donation, a
donor-while still healthy-gives prior consent to the removal of
organs." The donor receives no financial compensation but is
reimbursed for any expenses associated with the removal of the
organ. 2 The United States has adopted this policy which is
codified under The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984."8 The
rationale behind the voluntary allocation system is to avoid the
commercialization of organs and thereby protect societal values. 4
The organ supplier is typically a family member of a person
who has been fatally injured in an accident. The families, who

28.
organs.
29.
30.
31.

See id. In addition, the Brazilian constitution prohibits the sale of human
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
See Bill Seeks, supra note 3.
See Williams, supra note 21, at 333.
See Lloyd Cohen, Increasingthe Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a

Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).

32. See Williams, supra note 21, at 333.
33. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274(e) (Supp. IV 1986)). The
Act states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if
the transfer affects interstate commerce." Id. at § 274(e).
34. See Williams, supra note 21, at 333-34.
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are normally consulted by medical professionals, often agree to
organ donation out of altruism." This policy, therefore, relies
heavily on the altruistic desire of donors to supply organs to
patients who are often in desperate need.
1. Voluntary Inter-vivos Donations
Voluntary inter-vivos donation allows a living person to
donate a paired organ-a kidney, for example-along with
replenishable bodily items such as blood, plasma, skin and bone
marrow." Countries, such as Britain, that adopt this policy
normally limit the potential donors to family members because of
the belief that a person who is unrelated to the donor may not
have sufficient incentive to donate an organ and may in fact be
selling the organ.3 7 Countries with no brain-death law and which
want to prevent commercialization of organs, rely exclusively on
voluntary inter-vivos donations. 3
2. Voluntary Cadaveric Organ Donations
Under a system of voluntary cadaveric organ donation, a
deceased organ donor can donate at least twenty-five different
body parts and fluids.3' Almost all of these cadavers must be
placed on a respirator and ventilator to ensure that oxygen is
delivered to the organs." Thus, a country that implements this
system must have a brain-death law because when the heart dies
the other organs also die and are no longer useful for
transplantation.4' In addition, there must be a mechanism
through which the donor's intent can be registered.42

35. See id. at 333. Williams further suggests that some donors may actually be
motivated by coercion or a sense of moral duty when a close relative's life is at stake, thus
the donation is not necessarily voluntary. See id. at n.114.
36. See id. at 334.
37. See id.
38. The result is that only a small number of organs are secured and this shortage
inevitably leads to human rights violation linked to the procurement of organs. See id.
39. These include parts of the inner ear, a variety of glands (pancreas, pituitary,
thyroid, parathyroid, and adrenal), blood vessels, tendons, cartilage, muscles (including
the heart), testicles, ovaries, fallopian tubes, nerves, skin, fat, bone marrow, blood, livers,
kidneys, and corneas. See Cohen, supra note 31, at 3.
40. See id. at 4.
41. See Williams, supra note 21, at 335.
42. See id.
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The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act4 is the legislative
mechanism that regulates posthumous organ donation in the
United States. The Act allows any adult of sound mind to permit
or bar the posthumous use of her organs for transplantation,
research or teaching." A person may donate all or a portion of
her body by will 5 or through a non- testamentary document such
as a donor card.4" Where the individual does not express a choice,
the next of kin can donate the deceased organs posthumously.47
Donees include hospitals and doctors, accredited medical and
dental schools, organ banks and individuals in need of
transplants. 481
The main weakness of voluntary cadaveric donation is that it
has consistently failed to provide enough donor organs to keep49
pace with the ever-growing demand for organ transplantation.
As a result, nations have had to introduce laws to increase the
number of organs procured. The United States, for example,
added a provision to the 1986 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
barring hospitals from participating in Medicare and Medicaid
unless they establish "written protocols for the identification of
potential organ donors."" Under this provision, medical
professionals must inform members of the potential donor's
family of their choice to donate the patient's organs if the patient
dies. 51 In spite of this, many doctors still do not ask the family if
they wish to donate the deceased's organs and even when the
deceased's intent is clearly expressed, many doctor's still feel
ethically compelled to get consent from the deceased's family.52
Because of the failure of voluntary cadaveric donation to
secure adequate organ procurement, some commentators have
suggested that an incentive would increase organ donation. One
particularly interesting suggestion is to give individuals who
have pledged to donate their organs priority in receiving organs

43.
44.
45.
46.

See 42 U.S.C.A. 274(e), §§ 1-4 (1968).
Seeid. at§ 2(b).
See id.
See id. §4.

47. See id. §2.
48. See id. §3.
49. See Roger D. Blair & David Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative
Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 403, 405 (1991).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320 b - 8 (a)(1)(A).

51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320 b - 8 (a)(1)(A)(ii).
52. See Williams, supra note 21, at 336.
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in the event the organ donor needs a transplant. 3 While this
proposal avoids the ethical and legal concerns associated with the
financial incentive that organ sale poses, it raises problems of its
own. First, it discriminates against those who do not donate
because of genuine religious or moral reasons.'
Second, it
undermines altruism, which is the linchpin of voluntary
donation.55 Third, it discriminates against the procrastinating
donor.5" However, perhaps the most important reason why
priority in receiving a needed organ may not be an effective
means of increasing organ donation is the unwillingness of most
people to contemplate their own mortality. 7
Brazil has failed to procure an adequate supply of organs
under a system of voluntary non-pecuniary donation." The
reasons for this failure include a general distrust of the
government, lack of adequate infrastructure to support organ
transplantation, reluctance of citizens to contemplate their own
deaths and a general distrust of medical professionals.59
Given these factors, unless the Brazilian government can
win the confidence of the public-a task that can only be
achieved over an extended period of time-voluntary organ
donation is unlikely to increase in the near future. Moreover, a
massive public awareness campaign would be needed to inform
the public of both the need for organs and the safeguards built
into the system to protect the rights of donors. However, even in
countries where these mechanisms are in place, organ donation
is still inadequate." Consequently, additional incentives may be
needed to increase organ donation.
C. Organ Sale and Trade
An organ sale and trade procurement system offers donors
financial compensation, which provides added incentive to donate

53. See id. at 337.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Cohen, supranote 31, at 11.
58. See Frayssinet, supra note 10.
59. See Diana Jean Schemo, Rio Journal; Death's New Sting in Brazil: Removal of
Organs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al.
60. See Williams, supra note 21, at 340.
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organs and thus alleviate the shortage of transplant organs.
Organ sale and trade is justified on two grounds: social utility
and personal autonomy." However, these two justifications can
be challenged on several points.
First, the social utility
argument is based on the assumption that a market system
would alleviate or "solve" the organ-shortage problem.'
But even strong supporters of organ sale procurement
concede that the effect of an organ market on the supply of
organs is uncertain because of the potential for financial
incentive to "completely subsume the gift approach as
'vendors'.. . 'sell now' rather than 'donate later'."' The social
utility argument for organ sales thus undermines the gift system
and its impact on the supply of organs is uncertain.
Second, the personal autonomy argument is grounded in the
"liberal individualist tradition that affirms the moral freedom of
persons to do with their bodies what they wish, free of
interference from the state, so long as others are not harmed by
the action."65 This argument ignores the fact that even in highly
individualist nations, such as the United States, public policy
concerns limit the individual's freedom to engage in activities
that do not appear to harm others. Prostitution is a classic
example of these restrictions.
Next, the personal autonomy argument presumes that an
individual has private property rights in her organs. 6 However,
the World Health Organization has denounced the sale of human
organs' 7 and the United States has banned the sale of organs."
Several rationales are offered for the ban on the sale of human
organs. First, access to the market would be conditioned on the
willingness to sell and the ability to pay.69 Consequently,
61. See Blair & Kaserman, supra note 49, at 420 (arguing in favor of a market
alternative to voluntary donation).
62. See Courtney S. Campbell, The Selling of Organs, the Sharing of Self, 19
SECOND OPINION 69, 70 (Oct. 1993).
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 71. The issue of private property rights in one's organs will be addressed
in Part IV B.
66. See Cohen, supra note 31, at 15.
67. See
WORLD
HEALTH
ORGANIZATION,
WHA
40.13,
HUMAN
ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: A REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, at 8 (1987-1991).
68. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (Supp. 1986).
69. See Campbell, supranote 62, at 72.
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transplant decisions would not be based on medical necessity, but
instead would be based on the recipient's financial status.
Inevitably, the poor would be deprived of life-saving organs while
the wealthy would have access to organ transplantation.
A second rationale for banning the sale of human organs
flows from the assumption that a person has viable alternative
choices under a personal autonomy regime. However, where a
desperate Brazilian mother of four is willing to sell her heart in
exchange for jobs for her four children,0 the notion that a
perfectly autonomous exchange transpires is highly questionable.
Instead, the decision to sell appears to be based on an irrational
act of desperation, which is inconsistent with the concept of
personal autonomy. Third, no well regulated commercial market
for human organs exist; those countries that allow organ sales
are among the worst violators of human rights.7 Last, the
personal autonomy argument ignores the psychological
alienation that organ sale may have on some vendors. "To sell an
organ symbolizes a selling of part of the self." 2 In contrast, the
donation of an organ after death avoids the risk of alienation
since the body has undergone "a form of natural severing. "73
Moreover, an organ donated during life may communicate
powerful transcendent themes of sacrifice, communion, and love
while also creating a sense of community. 4
Proponents of organ sales respond to these criticisms by
asserting that a market system would eliminate the black
market,7 that medical professionals engaged in transplantation
are compensated therefore there is nothing immoral or unethical
about organ sales,76 that a decrease in the number of donated
organs would be outweighed by the overall increase of the
number of organs procured,7 and that inequities are inherent in
all markets. 8 Despite these claims, the potential for human
rights violations, such as illegal trading and murdering for

70. See Williams, supra note 21, at 323.
71. See id. at 345.
72. Campbell, supra note 62, at 77.

73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See Williams, supra note 21, at 345.
76. See Theodore Silver, The Case For a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed
Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 702 (1988).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 701.
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organs, coupled with the risk of abuses resulting from organ
sales by the indigent, has forced some states to ban the
commercial sale of human organs."
Organ sale is not a viable option for Brazil's legislature
because "[t]he Constitution promulgated in Brazil on 5 October
1988 prohibits (in Section 199) any kind of commercial
transactions in human organs, tissues and substances (intended
for transplantation, research, or therapeutic purposes), as well as
any blood or blood derivatives."" In spite of this, Brazil is still a
huge market for organ traffickers8' and there have been reports
of bodies "washed up on the beach, their kidneys surgically
removed."" Commendably, the legislature has included the
reduction of organ trafficking as one of its objectives under the
Presumed Organ Donation Law. 83
IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PRESUMED
CONSENT

"Presumed consent" or "routine salvage" is a procurement
system in which all decedents are presumed to donate their
organs unless the decedent or her survivors expressly state
otherwise.' Although the individual and the surviving family
have a right to object to organ donation, this right must be
exercised affirmatively.85 At least fourteen nations currently
employ a presumed consent system.86 In the United States, while
the federal government has not adopted a presumed consent
organ procurement policy, several states have employed
presumed consent for the harvesting of corneas. s7

79. See Williams, supra note 21, at 346-47. The European Community, for example,
has banned the sale of organs because of the disproportionate impact that it would have
on the poor. See id. at 347 n.207.
80. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 67, at 16.
81. See Uruguay Cracks Ring Selling Human Organs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1991, at
C1O. In fact, Brazil was the trafficers' largest market. See id.
82. Williams, supra note 21, at 323 n.36.
83. See Bill Seeks, supra note 3.
84. Silver, supra note 76, at 703.
85. See id.
86. The countries include: Austria, The Czeck Republic, Denmark, France, Finland,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. See id.
87. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d. 1188 (Fla. 1986); GeorgiaLyons Eye Bank, Inc. v.
Lavant, 335 S.E. 2d. 127 (Ga. 1985) (holding that law which gives coroner presumed
consent to remove deceased's cornea without the consent of relatives is constitutional).
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Presumed consent, when rigidly enforced, has proven to be
the most effective means of maximizing organ procurement! s
However, even in countries where this system has been
successful in increasing organ donation, there is still a waiting
list for organs since the optimum number of organs is not secured
due to the insistence of some doctors on getting the approval of
family members. 9 Presumed consent is therefore viewed by some
as a system that increases organ donation without unduly
burdening personal freedom." The merits of this claim will be
discussed in the next two sections.
A.

The Advantages of PresumedConsent

Apart from the fact that presumed consent has been proven
to be the most effective means of procuring organs-and thereby
saving more lives-several other arguments have been offered in
favor of a presumed consent system. First, presumed consent is
alleged to be more compassionate toward family and society. 1
Decisions concerning organ donation often occur amidst the
trauma of the loss of a family member. During these traumatic
events, "when our lives have become unraveled, we need ritual,
routine and automatic procedures. These procedures ought to be
those that reflect our collective judgment expressed in more
normal times."92 Presumed consent thus implements society's
more reasoned judgment, the argument goes, at a time when
grieving relatives93 are ill equipped to make a truly informed and
rational decision.

Second, advocates of presumed consent claim that the
system does not radically deviate from traditional humanistic
values because "by making the basic presumption one which
favors life, and thus putting the burden of objecting upon persons
who would deny life to another, the policy of saving human life is

88. In Austria, for example, the donation rate for kidneys is twice that of the United
States. See Williams, supra note 21, at 340.
89. Some doctors request the consent of relatives in order to avoid potential
lawsuits. See id. at 340-41.
90. See Silver, supra note 76, at 703-04.
91. See id. at 704.
92. Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplants:The Cost of Success, 13 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1983, at 23, 25-26.
93. See id.
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given priority."' Instead of cheapening human life, supporters of
presumed consent view the policy as a means of reinforcing the
value of human life.
Third, supporters of presumed consent also argue that the
system is more cost effective than voluntary donation because of
lower advertising and public awareness overhead. 95 Additionally,
presumed consent is easier to manage than voluntary donation
since the physician does not have to get the consent of the
deceased's relatives thus increasing the odds that the organ is as
fresh as possible. Last, proponents of presumed consent assert
that the opt-out provision affirms the individual's freedom by
ensuring that the donor's choice is honored, instead of allowing
relatives to decide whether or not to donate the decedent's
organs.9 7
B.

The Disadvantagesof Presumed Consent

Critics of presumed consent argue that the risks associated
with presumed consent outweigh the benefits that the system
offers. First, while conceding that the system increases the
number of organs available for transplant, opponents point out
that the system has not provided an adequate supply of organs."
Second, instead of reducing the bereaved family's anguish,
presumed consent might actually amplify the family's anguish by
forcing the family to protest donation at a time when the
hospital's good will is cherished." The family must, therefore,
wrestle not only with the issue of the deceased's wishes, but also
the hospital's implicit interest in securing the deceased's organs.
Third, critics argue that presumed consent "insidiously
exploits the citizen's regrettable reluctance to dissent, even
though dissent is her right. It would depend for its success on
the unhappy fact that most humans are disinclined toward active
protest of that which is customary and routine.""' In addition,
94. Silver, supra note 76, at 705.
95. See id. at 705-06.
96. See Williams, supra note 21, at 363.
97. See id. at 362.
98. See David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the
OrganDeficit, 5 IND. J. OF GLOBAL STUD. 621, 649 (1998).
99. Silver, supra note 75, at 706.
100. Id.
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presumed consent is viewed as "conscription in disguise" since
the government gives citizens the impression that they have the
right to object to donation, when in fact many would not. 1' As a
dissenter may not be able
result, the procrastinating or reluctant
02
opt-out.
to
right
the
exercise
to
Fourth, presumed consent undermines the inherent
altruistic benefits that voluntary donation provides."' The final
major criticism of presumed consent, and the most relevant one
to the Brazilian situation, is that the system will "lead to a
situation where the poor, the uneducated, and the legally
disenfranchised might bear a disadvantageous burden, and only
the more advantaged groups would exercise autonomy" since only
the more advantaged groups would be aware of their right to optout.0 4 The more advantaged group would also benefit from the
increased supply of organs because they are far more likely to be
able to pay the cost of transplant surgery than are the indigent.
V. CHALLENGES TO BRAZIL'S PRESUMED CONSENT LAW
Having outlined the arguments for and against the system of
presumed consent, several possible challenges to Brazil's version
of the law will now be evaluated.
The statute might be
challenged under the theories of property right, privacy right,
freedom of conscience, and on public policy grounds.
A.

A PropertyRight Challenge

The Brazilian constitution states that "the privacy, private
life, honor and image of persons are inviolable, and the right to
compensation for property or moral damages resulting from the
violation thereof is ensured.""' If a decedent's organs are
considered property, removal of these organs without
06
compensation would amount to a "taking.""
However, it is
doubtful that cadaveric organs can be considered property since
it is unlikely that cadavers have constitutional rights.0 7 Even
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
See Williams, supra note 21, at 343. See also Campbell, supra note 62, at 77.
See id.
Id.
CF. Art. 5 § 10.
See Silver, supra note 76, at 712.
See id. at 713-15.
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under the Anglo-American common law, for example, there is no
true property interest in a cadaver; instead, the next of kin in the
United States have a quasi-property interest which is limited to
custody of the body for burial or lawful disposition." 8
Furthermore, property implies the existence of a value which
is capable of transfer from one owner to another for equivalent
value." 9 Since the Brazilian constitution prohibits the sale of
human organs, " ° post-mortem organs are not amenable to
exchange for value and would therefore not qualify as property.
A property right challenge to the Presumed Organ Donation Law
is therefore unlikely to succeed.
B. A Right to Privacy Challenge
The Brazilian constitution also protects the privacy of the
individual."1 ' However, as in the case of a property right claim, it
is doubtful that the privacy of the deceased is subject to
constitutional protection.112 Even in the United States, "there is
now little reason to believe that the decision to withhold postmortem organs would fall within the sphere of constitutionally
13
protected decision-making recognized by the Supreme Court."
Even if there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy,
the Brazilian government may still be able to defend the
Presumed Organ Donation Law on the grounds that it promotes
a state interest-the acquisition of organs to preserve life-of
sufficient magnitude to justify the intrusion into protected
decision-making.'
In addition, "an individual's interest in
preserving bodily integrity while alive is not equivalent to the
interest in bodily integrity after death, " "' and, thus, post-mortem

organ retrieval is not unduly burdensome to the deceased's
privacy interests. As such, a privacy challenge to the law is
unlikely to prevail.

108.
109.
110.
11L
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
See Silver, supra note 76, at 715.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See Silver, supra note 76, at 717.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 718.
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C. Freedom of Conscience
The Federal Council on Medicine has challenged the
constitutionality of the Presumed Organ Donation Law on the
basis that the "law violates both individual rights of citizens and
medical ethics because it forces doctors to perform actions that go
against their conscience."116 The Brazilian constitution
guarantees that the "freedom of conscience and of belief is
inviolable, ensuring the free exercise of religious cults and
guaranteeing, as set forth
117 in the law, the protection of places of
worship and their rites."
While it could be argued that this provision relates to
religious freedom and is, therefore, not applicable to the
Presumed Organ Donation Law, such a narrow interpretation of
the law seems unwarranted."' Instead, the stronger argument for
the government is that the law expressly allows citizens to optout of the system, and therefore each person reserves the right to
honor her conscience. In fact, while ruling that the law is
constitutional, Brazil's federal attorney, Gerald Brindero,
observed that although the law allows physicians to remove
organs without family consent, it did not bar them from
respecting the wishes of family members." 9 This appears to be a
more reasonable interpretation of the law and sounder public
policy which recognizes the possibility that an individual did not
have the opportunity to oppose donation.

D. PublicPolicy Challenge
The strongest challenge to Brazil's model of presumed
consent is that the system is both unethical and ineffective public
policy. First, "[e]xploitation of one's reluctance to assert her
rights is not a sound basis for social policy." 2 ' It is, therefore,
unethical to impose a policy which depends on the reluctance or
116. McDaniels, supra note 5.
117. C.F. Art. 5 § 6.
118. For example, the government clearly could not successfully argue that it is free
to violate a citizen's freedom of conscience on political issues because politics is not
specifically mentioned in the freedom of conscience provision of the constitution.
119. See New "Presumed Consent" Law in Brazil Draws Ire of Public, Physician
Groups, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Jan. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.

120. See Silver, supra note 76, at 706.
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ignorance of citizens for its success-even if the motive of the
state might be commendable.
In the present context, the problem is not the motive of those
who would assert rights or claims to our bodies. That motive is
typically found to be the preservation of life and health and the
cure of the sick. Rather, the problem is found in the details of
the proposed solutions. Because they seek to directly regulate
the human body, the risk of unintentionally trampling upon
individual rights and liberties is ever present. As such, there
arises a need to recognize danger when it is not intended and to
bring to bear a clear eye and an inquiring mind on proposals
which directly affect our persons and our liberties. Any new law
that confers power over the human body, whether made by a
legislature or by a court, has such an aspect and should give us
121
pause.
With millions of illiterates and workers who are fearful of
losing their jobs if they take time off to opt-out, 122 there is a
strong probability that millions of Brazilians will be unable to
exercise their right to exempt from the Presumed Organ
Donation Law. Consequently, the law will have a disparate
impact on the disenfranchised who will, in essence, be supplying
transplant organs for the wealthy. Furthermore, given Brazil's
human rights record, 123 there is the risk that over zealous
physicians might extract organs from potential donors before
death or fail to provide adequate care to patients in order to
hasten death and then harvest the deceased's organs.
The presumed consent law has also proven to be highly
ineffective in increasing the organ supply. In fact, support for
organ donation has actually declined under the law from seventyfive percent to sixty-three percent and many Brazilians have
"rushed" to register their objection to organ donation because of
124
strong distrust of the government and medical professionals.
Moreover, the problem has been compounded by the conflicting
messages sent by government officials. The Minister of Health,
for example, has advised doctors to obtain permission from
121. See Jefferies, supra note 98, at 650.
122. See McDaniels, supra note 5.
123. "Despite encouraging good faith efforts by many authorities, including at the
federal executive level, human rights violation [in Brazil] continued to be severe and
varied." See Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, 92.
124. Schemo, supra note 59.
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relatives before removing a patient's organs, while the legal
counsel for the Health Ministry has threatened to prosecute
doctors who seek consent from a patient's relatives.2 5 This
climate of uncertainty, coupled with bureaucratic blunders and
inadequate infrastructure, has further eroded support for the
Presumed Organ Donation Law. The law clearly needs to be
modified if it is to achieve the legislature's objective of increasing
the supply of transplant organs while simultaneously avoiding
the legal, ethical, and policy issues it raises.
VI. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE PODL
The most important change the law needs is a provision
which allows family members to opt-out a patient who did not
have the opportunity register her objection to the law. This
provision would help to reassure citizens who have yet to opt-out
of the system or are undecided as to whether or not to donate
their organs, that the government and hospital personnel would
not have the sole right to make this decision. In addition, such
an amendment would not only reduce the level of distrust the
public has for the government, but it would place Brazil among
the vast majority of presumed consent nations that use this
provision as a means of protecting patients' wishes.
Next, a massive public education campaign is needed to
ensure that all citizens are fully aware of their right to opt-out of
the system. This aids in ensuring that a person who fails to optout of the system has made a voluntary, informed decision to do
so and is not simply ignorant of the right to object to organ
donation. Admittedly, this may result in a reduction in the
number of potential donors, but it avoids the unethical practice of
securing organs based on the fact that a person is uninformed of
her right to withhold donation.
VII. CONCLUSION
These changes, along with an improvement in the organ
collection infrastructure, will provide Brazil with an effective
organ procurement system with adequate safeguards to protect
the interests of individual citizens from the potential abuses
inherent in presumed organ donation.
125. See id.
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ADDENDUM

Subsequent to this article being written, the Brazilian
government modified the Presumed Organ Donation Law to
allow family members to opt-out decedents who did not
personally opt out of the system.
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